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health actors should work with other 
sectoral actors to address these chal-
lenges while working to adapt existing 
strategies and create new ones that 
are more effective in this context.
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The Sydney Statement is one of 
the first framing documents on the 
principles for guiding global health 
security. Framing matters because 
the funding pool for development 
assistance for health is finite and has 
plateaued over the past decade.2,3 
Investments in global health security 
to prevent future catastrophes are 
subject to competing health priorities, 
such as scaling up the “most essential 
interventions” against ongoing epi-
demics of preventable morbidity 
and mortality in mothers, infants, 
and children in the Global South.4 
Development assistance for health that 
prioritises global health security could 
overwhelm or detract attention from 
multiple competing health priorities.3
Any overarching statement on global 
health security requires structured, 
inclusive, and incisive debate from 
all stakeholders, particularly from the 
Global South, such as the deliberations 
proposed for identifying synergies 
across related initiatives by the Lancet 
Commission.5 The purpose and 
nature of global health security is too 
important to be established through 
asynchronous online contributions 
and normalised through social media. 
In the interests of pursuing everyone’s 
health, there should not be a premature 
closure of the debate.
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The responsibility and 
potential of public health
In 2019, the Editors proposed that the 
challenges to halting the Ebola out-
break in the DR Congo are “principally 
a political problem” and no longer 
within the scope of public health.1
This assertion problematically 
compartmentalises the social and 
political drivers of health outside the 
purview and responsibility of the 
medical community, and it implies 
that simply pursuing conventional 
public health approaches is a good 
enough response, even if such 
approaches are insufficiently effective 
because of social and political factors. 
We disagree and think that the 
obligation of public health must be 
to achieve healthful outcomes, even if 
that entails navigating messy politics 
and daunting social challenges or 
reformulating delivery strategies to 
overcome related barriers.
Such actions are how progress 
was made against HIV. Even after 
the advent of antiretrovirals, HIV 
was thought to be untreatable in 
sub-Saharan Africa and countries like 
Haiti because of the implementation-
related challenges posed by poverty.2 
This perception was debunked when 
health actors made these structural 
barriers central to their mandate and 
developed novel ways to deliver care 
despite such factors.3
A similar approach must be taken 
to combat this Ebola outbreak. It is 
not enough to pursue conventional 
approaches and look elsewhere when 
those approaches are confounded by 
the security and political challenges 
of eastern DR Congo. We are not 
advocating health actors to directly 
solve the political hurdles or take up 
arms to create security. However, 
Careful governance of 
African biobanks
In a World Report,1 54gene (a start-
up genomics company) was featured 
as the first pan-African biobank that 
plans to collect 40 000 biospecimens 
from ten hospitals in Nigeria by 
the end of 2019. The World Report1 
has subsequently been reproduced 
in the media.2 In a world where 
media reports are dominated by 
fake news, clarification of African 
biobank initiatives is impera tive. 
These initiatives have been active 
for years and have delivered tangible 
interventions that affect Africans who 
donate biospecimens for research 
and empower the researchers who 
are resident in Africa.
54gene claims to be the first pan-
African biobank, but both accredited 
and non-accredited pan-African bio-
banks have been around for as long 
as there has been genetic research 
in Africa by Africans. Initiatives such 
as H3Africa for genetics research in 
Africa, B3Africa for biobank data 
sharing between Africa and Europe, 
and the Global Emerging Pathogens 
Treatment Consortium for biosecu rity 
have contributed substantially towards 
the formalisation of biospecimen 
and governance structures for data 
by African scientists who engage 
For more on H3Africa see 
www.h3africa.org
For more on B3Africa see 
www.b3africa.org
For more on the Global 
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the 40 000 samples earmarked by 
54gene in Nigerian state hospitals) 
are essential stakeholders in health 
research. It is imperative that every 
academic initiative and public or 
private partnership that establishes 
itself in the biobanking space does 
so while recognising the rules of 
engagement around collection and 
sharing of biological samples and data 
for the purpose of improving human 
health. Failure to do so can cause 
irreparable damage to meaningful 
community engagement.6 We remain 
gravely concerned that 54gene is “in 
talks with stakeholders in six other 
African countries where it is planning 
to set up biobanks”.1
We urge 54gene to reflect on South 
Africa’s experience 4 years ago when 
a health insurer announced genetic 
testing for its members at a competitive 
price in partnership with an American 
company.7 This proposition, at that 
time, exposed South Africa’s regulatory 
framework on the use, storage, and 
export of biological samples. In turn, 
Nigeria needs to reflect on its regulatory 
framework governing the export of 
biological material and associated data 
and ensure that measures are in place 
to safeguard the rights of Nigerian 
citizens who opt to donate their genetic 
material for the public good.
Good governance with respect to 
biological samples and their associated 
data requires complex discussions 
around community engagement, 
public learning and understanding of 
science, ethical principles of informed 
consent, storage of samples into antiq-
uity, secondary use, return of results, 
and commercialisation. We wonder 
if 54gene considered the work done 
in Africa on these topics, especially if 
they feel that they are pioneering this 
space in Africa.
AC has a trademark on the name of an open-source 
software that is pending. In addition, both AC and 
AA are active African researchers in the field of 
biobanking and biobank informatics and have 
published in this space too, which has informed 
their views in this Correspondence.
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with international counterparts. 
These efforts have translated into 
evolving policies and guidelines for 
establishing regional African bio-
banks and guidelines for the sharing 
of biospecimens and data.3
As a result of the west African Ebola 
outbreak that brought the economy 
of many countries to a standstill and 
resulted in thousands of fatalities, 
the regional authorities have reacted 
aggressively to address the seemingly 
policy-free zone that Africa seems 
to represent with respect to human 
biological samples and data, which 
multiple opportunists have taken 
advantage of. This reaction was 
reflected by the mass movement of 
samples and data out of the region 
without appropriate diligence and 
governance.4,5 Government-to-gov-
ernment collaborations have led to 
a review of the policies and shortage 
of necessary structures to bank and 
disseminate samples of pathogens, 
especially during public health emer-
gencies of international concern. These 
collaborations have also resulted in 
the development of two biobank 
(also called biocontainment) facilities 
in Lagos, Nigeria, and Freetown, 
Sierra Leone, with elaborate commu-
nity engagement and governance 
structures.
The UN Security Council Committee, 
on resolution 1540 in collaboration 
with the African Union, is advancing 
the urgent need for countries in Africa 
to undergo legislative review that 
will curtail biopiracy especially with 
respect to samples that could be used 
or deployed for nefarious objectives. 
This process is resulting in substantial 
domestic review processes of national 
laws to address the rapid changes 
in science and technology and the 
domestication of policies and guidelines 
to manage the movement of biological 
samples, as well as diminishing the 
biorisk potential associated with the 
plethora of conflict hot spots in Africa.
Members of communities who 
are donors of biological samples 
(including those who intend to donate 
Refugees, asylum 
seekers, and immigrants 
in clinical trials
In 2017, the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) highlighted that current 
federal regulations should include 
protections for vulnerable popu-
lations (ie, pregnant women, fetuses, 
neonates, prisoners, and children). 
The issue of inclusivity specifically 
for under-represented populations 
is being debated in government. In 
338 phase 3 and phase 4 NIH-funded, 
actively recruiting studies registered 
with ClinicalTrials.gov, explicit exclusion 
was found for pregnant women, 
lactating women, children, older 
people, individuals with intellectual 
or developmental disabilities, and for 
those with physical disabilities.1
I suggest extending the definition 
of under-represented populations 
to include refugees, asylum seekers, 
